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... The [Irish] Government has today decided that an overall [fiscal] adjustment of
€15 billion over the next four years is warranted . . . The key reasons for the signif-
icant increase from the figure announced in Budget 2010 are lower growth prospects
. . . and higher debt interest costs. (Statement by the Irish Government, 26 October
2010).1
1 Introduction
During the European sovereign debt crisis, sharp rises in yields on government bonds have
been met with promises from governments to accelerate and expand their fiscal consolidation
plans. To the extent the promises are acted upon, this behavior can be interpreted as a form of
market-imposed fiscal discipline. Against this background, we examine empirically, over a long
time series and across several European Union (EU) countries, the proposition that governments
systematically respond to increases in their cost of borrowing by improving their fiscal positions.
In doing so, the paper addresses an issue that, to date, has received little attention in acad-
emic research. As pointed out by Bayoumi et al. (1995), analyses of whether fiscal authorities
are subject to market discipline should address two questions. First, do markets adjust the terms
at which they lend to governments when fiscal positions change? Second, do governments ad-
just their fiscal positions when their cost of borrowing changes? A great deal of research has
investigated the first question in isolation.2 However, the hypothesis of market-induced fiscal
discipline implies simultaneous responses of government bond market prices and fiscal policies,
thus suggesting that the price and quantity of public debt are jointly determined. Yet, the cau-
sation from the cost of public debt service to fiscal policy decisions has, until recently, received
little attention in the empirical literature, although a few recent papers have contributed to
reducing this gap.3 This paper aims to bring some balance to the joint determination of fiscal
1http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6552&CatID=1&StartDate=01+January+2010
2Since the work of Evans (1985), there has been a large empirical literature on the effect of fiscal policy on
long-term interest rates. Some more recent studies include Faini (2006), Ardagna et al. (2007), Attinasi et al.
(2009), Laubach (2009), Schuknecht et al. (2009) and Afonso and Rault (2011).
3For instance, Theofilakou and Stournaras (2012) estimate a fiscal rule for a panel of European countries
and find evidence in favour of including government bond yields in governments’ reaction functions. Their
methodological approach is different to that used here, as they estimate a single equation model. In a recent
contribution to this literature, Dell’Erba et al. (2015) study whether market pressure has acted as a trigger for
fiscal consolidation in a sample of OECD countries over a 30 year horizon. In contrast to our approach, which
uses changes in the primary balance as a summary metric of the fiscal response and treats fiscal contractions
and expansions symmetrically, Dell’Erba et al. (2015) focus on specific multi-year fiscal adjustment episodes.
Mauro et al. (2013) assess the interaction between the sovereign cost of borrowing and the level of public debt
in a panel of 55 countries over up to two centuries and find that the primary balance response to changes in
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variables and the cost of government borrowing by empirically assessing the budgetary response
to exogenous interest rate changes in a dynamic context.
To motivate our empirical analysis, we present simulations of a simple model, in which the
government of a small open economy optimally commits to a state-contingent path of government
spending, distortive taxes, and debt. The government is able to issue debt on capital markets,
paying the world interest rate plus a risk premium. In this set up, an exogenous rise in the risk
premium demanded by investors for holding this debt generates a tightening of the budgetary
path.4 The optimal speed and composition for budget tightening is dependent on several
structural features of the economy, including the initial debt ratio, the cost of adjusting fiscal
instruments, and the presence of fiscal rules.
The model based simulations are then confronted with empirical estimates of the response
of fiscal variables to exogenous changes in the government’s cost of borrowing. We use a vector
autoregressive (VAR) model for a panel of 14 European countries and annual data from 1970
to 2011. The empirical analysis faces two important methodological challenges. First, fiscal
policy and the cost of borrowing are jointly determined, making it diffi cult to isolate exoge-
nous movements in the cost of borrowing for governments. To overcome this challenge, we use
the sign-restriction methodology of Mountford and Uhlig (2009) to identify several fundamen-
tal shocks that have been well documented in the macroeconometric literature. Having thus
identified business cycle and policy shocks, we treat any additional unexpected movements in
interest rates, orthogonal to the business cycle and fiscal policy shocks, as exogenous shocks to
the cost of borrowing.
The second methodological challenge relates to the fact that empirical estimates must respect
the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. We impose this restriction by keeping track
of the nonlinear debt dynamics using the methodology of Favero and Giavazzi (2007). On this
basis, it is possible to assess whether the fiscal response is suffi cient to offset the dynamics of
government debt slightly increases when sovereign bond yields are higher. Similar to our paper, Debrun and
Kinda (2013) model the trade-off between primary balance adjustment and higher debt service in response to a
cost of borrowing shock; on this basis, they estimate the primary balance response to higher interest expenditures
in a single-equation, dynamic panel setting for advanced and emerging countries.
4Cost of borrowing shocks might originate from various sources, including for instance a change in global risk
aversion, shifts in the supply and demand of foreign sovereign debt securities on account of additional countries
gaining access to global financial markets, or idiosyncratic vulnerabilities that lower the perceived creditworthiness
of certain issuers. The exact source of the cost of borrowing shock is immaterial for the budgetary response of
the fiscal authorities, as predicted by the model. In any case, the cost of borrowing shock raises the interest
payments and, via this channel, introduces a trade-off between fiscal tightening and debt sustainability concerns.
The key challenge in the empirical part is then to separate such shocks from other disturbances (for instance to
real activity and inflation) that endogenously affect both, the budgetary position and sovereign borrowing costs.
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rising debt generated by an increase in the cost of borrowing.5
We find a significant fiscal policy response to exogenous changes in the cost of borrowing. In
our baseline estimations, a 1 percentage point rise in the cost of borrowing leads to a cumulative
increase in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio of 1.75 percentage points after 10 years. However,
the debt-to-GDP ratio is 1.3 percentage points higher 10 years after the shock, i.e. the budgetary
response is insuffi cient to compensate for the automatic debt-increasing effect of higher borrowing
costs. The impulse responses reveal that the fiscal response is not immediate, with a significant
consolidation appearing only two years after the shock. Almost all the adjustment takes place
on the revenue side while primary expenditure remains broadly unchanged. Building on these
baseline results, we then assess features that, according to the model, may influence the fiscal
response to cost of borrowing shocks. In line with the theoretical predictions, we find that
countries subject to tighter constraints (deriving from formal fiscal rules or the domestic political
setup) tend to display a stronger response to cost of borrowing shocks.
Given the wide-ranging changes in the European fiscal framework over recent decades, the
effect of such rules on budgetary adjustment is particularly relevant in EU member states.
Separating our panel into EMU and non-EMU countries and the periods pre- and post-1992
(which marks the signing of the Maastricht Treaty), we find, consistent with the literature (see
for example Camba-Mendez and Lamo (2004) and Gali and Perotti (2003)), that there was a
systematic change in the behavior of fiscal policy following the introduction of the Maastricht
Treaty. Our estimates reveal that the sub-sample including the post-1992 EMU countries show a
significantly stronger fiscal consolidation response following a rise in the cost of borrowing than
the pre-1992 EMU sample. A possible interpretation of this pattern is that those countries
that eventually joined monetary union and its rules-based fiscal governance framework had
an additional incentive to compensate for higher interest payments (which count against the
Maastricht budget deficit criterion) by tightening their stance with respect to other budget
items.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model to clarify the
responses predicted by standard macro theory. Section 3 outlines the empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 discusses the policy implications and concludes.
5The non-linearity induced by the budget constraint implies that impulse responses in our setup will be sensitive
to economic conditions at the time of the shock, in particular the debt-to-GDP ratio. There is a rapidly growing
literature on the role of non-linearities in fiscal VARs following Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012).
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2 Theoretical motivation
The model describes a small open economy populated by a continuum of identical households
and a government. Households have preferences over private and public consumption goods
and hours worked and have access to incomplete international capital markets. The government
can also borrow on international capital markets, has two fiscal instruments, distortionary labor
income taxes and public consumption expenditure, and sets policy optimally under commitment.
2.1 The model






βt (u (ct, nt) + υ (gtξ
g
t )) , (1)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
ct = b
h
t − rht−1bht−1 + (1− τ tξτt )wtnt, (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, ct is private consumption, nt is hours worked,
and gtξ
g
t is public consumption (gt is a policy instrument while ξ
g
t is exogenous and stochastic).
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The functional form for preferences over ct and nt follows Greenwood et al. (1988), thus elim-
inating wealth effects on labor supply.7 The real wage is wt and τ tξτt is the tax rate on labor
income (τ t is the policy instrument while ξτt is an exogenous component). Households issue







is assumed to be an increasing and convex function of the aggregate debt-to-output ratio of the
private sector, b̃ht /yt. Production in the economy follows a linear technology, yt = ξ
a
tnt, which
implies that the real wage (before taxes) is equal to productivity, ξat . The first-order conditions
of the household problem are








where uc,t, for example, denotes the marginal utility of consumption.
6All shocks, ξxt , take the form ξ
x
t ≡ exp (εxt ) where εxt = ρxεxt−1 + σxuxt and uxt ∼ iid (0, 1).
7Appendix A.1 gives the functional form for preferences and debt elastic interest rates.
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The government can levy labor income taxes and issue debt in international capital markets













tnt − ϕg (gt, gt−1)− ϕτ (τ t, τ t−1) (5)
where ϕgt ≡
ψg
2 (gt − gt−1)
2 and ϕτt ≡
ψτ
2 (τ t − τ t−1)
2 are convex costs of adjusting government
expenditure and tax rates, respectively. These reduced-form costs play an important role in
shaping the responses to a cost of borrowing shock.8
Following the literature, these costs can be interpreted in different ways. First, they could
be administrative costs of changing the tax code or devising well-targeted government spending
programmes.9 Second, the adjustment costs might capture, in reduced form, the dynamics
of distributional conflict between different fiscal agents (or political parties) that have different
preferences over the mix of fiscal instruments. Tabellini (1986) showed that in this setting, the
non-cooperative equilibrium exhibits slower fiscal adjustment. Third, the adjustment costs can
be interpreted in analogy to the literature on optimal monetary-policy inertia. Aoki (2006)
and Woodford (1999) show that adjusting the monetary policy interest rate gradually is optimal
without imposing any penalty on interest rate variations. As long as there is some friction
due to which the policymaker cannot achieve its stabilization objectives independently in each
period, optimal policy is history dependent.
The interest rate on government borrowing, rgt ≡ rg (b
g
t , yt) ξ
r
t , like that of the households, is
assumed to be an increasing and convex function of the government debt-to-GDP ratio, bgt /yt,
where ξrt is the exogenous cost of borrowing shock of interest.
To close the model, we assume that the government is benevolent and is able to commit to
a time invariant (i.e. from the timeless perspective) optimal policy.10 The government solves
the following Lagrangian, which maximizes household utility subject to resource constraints and
8 In the macro-fiscal literature, fiscal policy is often specified as a set of highly autocorrelated fiscal instrument
rules to capture the gradual adjustment of fiscal policy. Instead, we assume the government faces adjustment
costs.
9Papers such as Browning (1976) and Mayshar (1991) estimate these administrative and compliance costs to
be of the order of one percent of tax revenues.
10An alternative would be to specify fiscal rules in which the tax and spending instruments respond to endoge-
nous macro variables, such as the output gap and government debt, as in Leeper et al. (2010). However, the
specific conjecture of this paper is that fiscal policy also reacts independently to interest rates. It is therefore
preferable to solve for optimal policy rather than specifying a set of ad hoc rules.
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are the Lagrange multipliers on the household and government bud-
get constraints (with equation 4 substituted in), and the household Euler equation, respectively.
We assume that the government has the same subjective discount factor, β, as the private sector.
The first-order conditions are given in Appendix A.1.
The objective of the government (in equation 6) also includes the term −ψ
td
2 (max {tdt, 0})
2 ,
where tdt is the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio (primary expenditures plus debt interest payments
minus total revenues). This additional term captures the penalty of violating the deficit criterion
of the Maastricht Treaty, in spirit of Beetsma and Debrun (2007).11
2.2 Calibration
Table 1 summarizes the calibration of the model and summarizes the steady state around which a
linear approximation of the model is taken. The calibration replicates several long-run averages
in our European data set. We hit a 50% debt-to-GDP ratio for both the private sector and
the government, broadly in line with the sample average of 51.3% for the government debt-to-
GDP ratio.12 We set φg = φh = 0.05, which implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio increases the cost of borrowing by 5 basis points, thus matching the findings
in Laubach (2009).13 The steady-state government interest rate is set below the household’s
subjective discount rate in order to induce a positive government debt-to-GDP ratio. Given
φg, achieving the 50% debt-to-GDP ratio required setting αg at .025.
11The Maastricht deficit criterion is violated when the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio is greater than 3 percent.
Since we work with a linear approximation, the feasible implementation of a penalty associated with large devia-
tions of the budget deficit is to have quadratic costs away from the steady state, so we take the max of tdt and
0, not 0.03.
12Unlike small open economy models featuring a non-optimizing fiscal agent, the steady state government debt-
to-GDP ratio is uniquely pinned down by the parameters φg and αg, where φg is the response of the government
interest rate to a marginal change in the debt-to-GDP ratio, and αg is the wedge between the steady state interest
rate and the discount rate, β−1.
13While the estimates in Laubach (2009) are based on US data, the available studies for EU countries tend to
include both the debt ratio and (primary) budget deficit as explanatory variables (see Ardagna et al. (2007)),
which makes it more diffi cult to apply the results to the calibration of our model.
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Table 1: Calibration and steady state
Symbol Description Value
Calibrated parameters
β Subjective discount factor 0.95
σ Preference parameter 2
θ Preference parameter 1.8333
ϑ Preference parameter 1.0138
αg Steady state interest rate discount 0.025
φg, φh Interest rate sensitivity parameter 0.05
ρr Cost of borrowing shock persistence parameter 0.8
Steady state moments
bg/y Government debt-to-GDP ratio 50%
bh/y Private sector debt-to-GDP ratio 50%
n Proportion of hours worked 25%
g/y Government primary spending-to-GDP ratio 40%
τ Tax rate 41.4%
rg, rh Government and private sector cost of borrowing 2.76%, 5.26%
The preference parameters are standard with ϑ calibrated such that households work 25%
of their time endowment. The weight on public consumption in the utility function is chosen
to achieve a government primary spending-to-GDP ratio of 40%, consistent with the long-run
average in our data set. The adjustment cost parameters, ψg and ψτ , as well as the penalty
for violating the fiscal rule, ψtd, do not feature in the steady state. The model is calibrated for
annual data, so β = 0.95 and ρr = 0.8, with the latter being approximately equal to 0.95 at a
quarterly frequency.
2.3 Impulse responses
When the government faces a higher path of borrowing costs, it must, at some point, generate
a higher primary balance path to preserve solvency. The government, however, faces two
important trade-offs in choosing the optimal path of its two fiscal policy instruments. The
first concerns the timing of adjustment. A sharp adjustment in the short-run can be costly
due to the convexity of the fiscal adjustment costs and the curvature of household preferences.
However, a longer-term, more gradual adjustment implies higher future interest payments. The
second trade-off concerns the composition of adjustment. Cutting primary expenditures entails
adjustment costs and a reduction in welfare due to the fall in public consumption, which directly
enters households’utility. Raising taxes also entails adjustment costs and increases labor market
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distortions. However, the tax increase allows the social planner to shift part of the economy’s
debt burden from the government (which, after the shock, is facing a relatively higher cost of
borrowing) to the private sector.
Figure 1 shows the impulse responses to an exogenous, unexpected one percentage point rise
in the government cost of borrowing. The grey shaded area shows the dispersion of responses
that the model generates within a given parameter space. The figure also highlights four
calibrations. The green squares and the red circles compare two extremes: responses with
extremely high and no adjustment costs, respectively. The most striking difference between
the two calibrations is in the response of the government debt-to-GDP ratio. In the calibration
without adjustment costs, the debt-to-GDP ratio drops by 1 percentage point, while in the
calibration with extremely high adjustment costs, it rises by 2.5 percentage points (from its
steady state level of 50 percent) by the end of the 10 year horizon. As the government makes
only very gradual adjustments to its fiscal instruments in the second scenario, it needs to issue
additional debt to cover interest payments, which is reflected in a rise in the debt-to-GDP
ratio. Without adjustment costs, the government cuts primary expenditure by 2 percentage
points on impact, after which the level of primary expenditure is slowly rebuilt. This cut in
primary expenditures translates into a fall in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio of almost
1 percentage point. The government also raises the tax rate on labor income by just over 0.1
percentage point. Since the real pre-tax wage in this model is equal to the level of productivity,
the labor tax rate is always equal to the total government revenue-to-GDP ratio. The rise in
the tax rates induces a reduction in labor supply and a consequent fall in output. Households
smooth consumption through increased borrowing.
The blue diamonds and the black-dash lines isolate the effect of the two fiscal instruments
by varying the relative weight given to the two adjustment costs. With the blue diamonds it
is relatively more costly to adjust taxes, while with the black-dashes it is more costly to adjust
primary expenditure.14 With the intermediate calibration of the adjustment cost parameters,
the model generates hump-shaped responses of the fiscal instruments to cost of borrowing shocks,
which is what we observe in our empirical analysis (see Section 4).
In summary, this stylized model —while allowing for an array of different patterns depending
14Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences imply no government spending multiplier in this model. Had we used
King et al. (1988) preferences instead, the model would generate a positive multiplier. However, we would also
get a rise in output growth following a cost of borrowing shock. This is because a cost of borrowing shock acts
like a wealth shock, lowering the present value of future disposable income. Households react by supplying more
labor which generates a counterintuitive rise in output.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a cost of borrowing shock










































































Note: Shaded area shows the dispersion of responses for parameters (ψτ , ψg) ∈ [0, 5000].
Table 2: Model predictions






g/y may be (+) if
εrt (−) (+) (−) · (+) ? all the adjustment
comes from τ t
Note: (+), (−), or ? indicates the response of variable z to shock εx on year of impact is positive, negative,
or ambiguous, respectively; · indicates the model is agnostic.
on the calibration of (partly unobserved) parameters —yields important qualitative predictions
for the fiscal response to cost of borrowing shocks (Table 2): τ t is expected to rise and gt/yt is
expected to fall in response to a cost of borrowing shock (except in the unusual scenario where
the fall in yt as a result of the increase in τ t dominates the fall in gt). Output growth is expected
to fall. The sign of the debt-to-GDP ratio response, however, is highly uncertain and hence of
key interest in our empirical analysis.
As the model abstracts from many features, including nominal rigidities (which would in-
form the response of inflation), Table 2 does not provide suffi cient information for imposing
restrictions in order to recover the structural shocks in the empirical VAR estimation in Sec-
tions 3-4. The model does, however, allow for several other standard macroeconomic shocks,
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namely, a technology, government spending, and income tax shock. There is one key feature
that distinguishes these three shocks from the cost of borrowing shock (see impulse responses in
Online Appendix B.2). In the case of a positive primary expenditure shock, the social planner’s
optimal response is to increase taxes; in the case of a positive income tax shock, the planner’s
optimal response is to increase government spending; and in the case of a positive technology
shock, the denominator (GDP) dominates, causing both the primary expenditure-to-GDP and
revenue-to-GDP ratio to fall. This positive comovement is in contrast to the cost of borrowing
shock where, for reasonable calibrations, the primary expenditure-to-GDP and revenue-to-GDP
ratios move in opposite directions. While we do not use this information in the formal iden-
tification procedure we employ in the empirical section, it serves as a useful cross check of our
results.
In the empirical analysis, we also test for heterogeneity in the responses to cost of borrowing
shocks depending on certain structural and institutional features of the economy. To motivate
these tests, we use the model to make three more sets of predictions (see Figure 2) about how
these features can effect fiscal adjustment.
In each experiment, the benchmark response (with ψg = 500, ψτ = 5, ψtd = 0) is shown in
red. In panel A, we consider the effect of imposing a Maastricht-style budget deficit criterion.
As shown by the blue circles (where ψtd = 50), the government responds more aggressively to
the cost of borrowing shock in the presence of fiscal rules that penalize large budget deficits.
As a consequence the debt-to-GDP ratio does not rise.15
In panel B we trace out the effect of different initial (or steady state) debt-to-GDP ratios (the
empirical counterpart is Figure 6). A higher initial debt-to-GDP ratio results in larger interest
payments for a given cost of borrowing shock. Thus, all else equal, the debt-to-GDP ratio rises
more quickly. In the model, the social planner cuts government spending by more when the
initial debt-to-GDP ratio is larger. The increase in tax rates, however, is not monotonic in the
initial debt-to-GDP ratio. This is because the government is trading off the counterproductive
effects of higher tax rates on a shrinking tax base. As a consequence, a higher initial debt-to-
GDP ratio leads to a longer period for the debt-to-GDP ratio to return to its initial value.
In Figure 8(C) in Section 4, we split our sample of countries into historically low and high
debt-to-GDP countries. To motivate the existence of historically low and high debt-to-GDP
ratio countries in the theoretical model we set up the following experiment: Suppose that the
15This finding motivates the analysis in Section 4, Figure 8(A) where we estimate subsamples pre- and post-
the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (that subjected member states to a common rules-based fiscal framework).
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Figure 2: Cost of borrowing shocks: Three further experiments
A. Maastricht-style budget deficit criterion








































Legend: • ψtd= 50, − Benchmark calibration (ψtd= 0)
B. Different initial (steady state) government debt-to-GDP ratios








































Legend: • bg/y = .8, − Benchmark calibration (bg/y = .5),  bg/y = .2
C. A government that does not fully internalize the effect of debt on interest rates








































Legend: • Gov. perceives φg= .025 (true φg= .05), − Benchmark calibration (perceived and true φg= .05)
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social planner is imperfect in that it does not fully internalize the effect of government debt
on interest rates – implemented in the model by assuming the government underestimates the
debt-elastic interest rate parameter, φg, by half. As a result of not fully internalizing the
effect of debt on interest rates, the government’s steady state debt-to-GDP ratio is twice as
high at 100% (shown with the blue circles). When the cost of borrowing shock arrives, the
government’s perceived marginal cost of allowing the debt-to-GDP ratio to rise is lower. As a
result, the government raises tax rates by less and the debt-to-GDP ratio rises by more than 4
percentage points in the space of 10 years.
Overall, the theoretical model highlights the trade-offs created by a cost of borrowing shock,
generates predictions on the likely response other variables that serve as a cross-check for the
structural cost of borrowing shock we identify in the data, and produces several predictions
about the relative fiscal adjustment for economies with different institutional structures.
3 Empirical methodology
This section describes the data, estimation technique, and identification strategy used to test
empirically the response of fiscal policy to cost of borrowing shocks.
3.1 Data
Our baseline empirical model is a VAR in seven variables:16 The government primary expenditure-
to-GDP ratio, pet, government revenue-to-GDP ratio, revt, GDP growth rate, gt, inflation rate,
πt, government nominal implicit interest rate, i
imp
t , a nominal 3 month interest rate, i
3m
t , and
a nominal 10 year bond yield, i10yt . The data covers an unbalanced panel of 14 European
countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Denmark, UK and Sweden) at an annual frequency from 1970 to 2011.17
In addition to the seven endogenous variables, we include the government debt-to-GDP ratio,
bt−1, as a lagged explanatory variable following the method of Favero and Giavazzi (2007). The
rationale for its inclusion is that it imposes the government’s intertemporal budget constraint
on fiscal responses to shocks. The government debt-to-GDP ratio evolves as follows
bt =
1 + iimpt
(1 + gt) (1 + πt)
bt−1 + pet − revt + st, (7)
16Later, we use a more parsimonious VAR in five variables for the purposes of subsample analysis after checking
that the baseline results are robust to the more parsimonious set up.







One of the advantages of the Favero and Giavazzi (2007) method is that the evolution of the debt-
to-GDP ratio in equation (7) is calculated recursively using the VAR’s endogenous variables.18
And hence, equation (7) motivates the form of the first five variables in our VAR.
Equation (7) also highlights that it is the implicit interest rate that directly determines debt-
to-GDP dynamics. At the same time, prevailing market yields, as an alternative measure for
the government cost of borrowing, may contain further information on the market perception of
a country’s fiscal and economic fundamentals which governments may internalize in their fiscal
decision-making —even if changes in market yields usually do not trigger pronounced immediate
changes in the implicit interest rate due to the inherent inertia in this measure. To reflect
these considerations we complement the iimpt variable in our VAR with the 10 year government
bond yield (which is the only maturity for which there is a long span of historical data across
many countries) as a measure of the current market interest rates.19 Appendix A.2 provides
a simple model, complementary in notation to the model in Section 2, which further illustrates
the conceptual link between the 10 year bond yield and the implicit interest rate in our VAR
and explains how to interpret the shocks that we identify. The short-term interest rate in the
VAR serves two purposes. The first is to help isolate cost of borrowing shocks from monetary
policy shocks. The second is that a 10 year bond yield may on its own be a poor proxy for
the prevailing interest rate environment. This is because governments finance themselves with
many different types and maturities of debt instruments, and endogenously adjust the maturity
at which they issue in order to minimize financing costs. Thus, having both a short and a long
rate helps to better reflect the term structure from which a government may choose to borrow.20
18 In fiscal accounts, there is a statistical discrepancy between the total borrowing requirement of the government
(the flow) and the change in the debt (the stock). The stock-flow adjustment that ensures equality in equation
(7) is denoted by st.
19 Intuitively, this approach combines the following perspectives: the implicit interest rate determines the amount
of resources that governments have to set aside to service their debts and hence cannot devote to other purposes,
such as expanding primary spending or lowering taxes without jeopardizing solvency. As such, it captures the
key trade-off that arises from a change in rgt in the model in Section 2. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
prevailing sovereign bond yields may contain additional information on the degree of perceived market discipline
that governments are facing. For instance, during the sovereign debt crisis in several euro area countries, press
and market commentary focused on certain thresholds for the 10-year sovereign bond yields beyond which they
suspected debt sustainability concerns to arise —without considering that the average cost of borrowing recorded
much more modest increases and substantially varied across countries over this period (for example, the Wall
Street Journal published an article on November 9, 2011 entitled " Italian Bond Yields Pass Key 7% Level").
Market yields typically give a more pronounced reflection of changes in the (perceived) creditworthiness of a
sovereign than the implicit interest rate measure, which is inherently inertial.
20Unfortunately, these two interest rates are the only ones available for which we have comparable, high-quality
data for the entire sample period (see Appendix A.3 for more details). There is some, albeit limited data,
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Appendix B.1 provides details on the time series properties of the data set. In particular,
it is worth noting that the debt-to-GDP ratio is found to exhibit a unit root for many of the
countries over our sample period, and that even using a panel based unit root test, we are not
able to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity in the data. The nonstationarity may
appear to be inconsistent with fiscal sustainability, but as stressed by Giannitsarou and Scott
(2006) and Bohn (2007), that is not necessarily the case. A suffi cient condition for sustainability
is the existence of a feedback from the level of debt to the current primary surplus. In the VAR
that we estimate, we will pay particular attention to this feedback from the debt-to-GDP ratio
on our two fiscal variables.
3.2 Estimation
The panel VAR we estimate takes the form:
Yi,t = A (`)Yi,t−1 + F (`)Wi,t−1 + ui,t ui,t ∼ iid (0,Σu) (9)
where Yi,t is a G × 1 vector of endogenous variables, Wi,t is an H × 1 vector of predetermined
variables, A (`) and F (`) are polynomials in the lag operator and iid means identically and
independently distributed. Time is denoted by the subscript t = 1, ..., T and the country unit is
denoted by the subscript i = 1, ..., N . We estimate a homogenous panel VAR in the sense that
the coeffi cient matrices Aj and Fj (where j denotes the lag) are independent of the country unit
subscript i. The relatively small size of our data set prevents us from exploring potential time
variation and cross-sectional heterogeneity in the VAR coeffi cients in a very systematic way.
However, we revisit this restrictive assumption by conducting subsample analysis in Section 4.
In our baseline estimation, G = 7 and Y =
[
pe, rev, g, π, iimp, i3m, i10y
]
. We have one
predetermined variable: H = 1 and W = b. As long as the estimated coeffi cient vector, F̂1, is
non-zero, all endogenous variables are able to respond to movements in the government debt-
to-GDP ratio. All the variables are country- and time-demeaned to account for both country
and time fixed effects. The panel VAR is estimated with two lags of the endogenous variables
and one lag of the predetermined variable.21
available on the maturity structure of government debt that we used to construct our own proxy for the marginal
cost of borrowing. However, the limited available sample size meant we could not use it as our our variable of
choice. Results using this measure are, however, available on request.
21The choice of lag length is important due to the serial correlation in the maturity structure of government
debt. As of 2010, the UK has the longest average maturity of debt of 13.7 years followed by Denmark with
7.9 years. Finland has the shortest average maturity with 4.3 years. The average maturity of debt across all
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The inclusion of the debt-to-GDP ratio following Favero and Giavazzi (2007) gives rise to two
diffi culties. First, the intertemporal budget constraint is a nonlinear function of the endogenous
variables. Thus, when we generate impulse responses to shocks, the results will be sensitive to
the initial debt-to-GDP ratio and the size of the shock.
Second, in the fiscal accounts data the stocks and flows do not exactly tally and the residual
is captured in the stock-flow adjustment variable, st (see equation 7). The inclusion of st in the
endogenous vector, Y , would ensure that the debt-to-GDP ratio holds as an identity but would
also increase the number of coeffi cients we would need to estimate.22
To draw inferences about Φ = (A (`) , F (`)) and Σu, we use a Bayesian approach, which
combines information from sample and priors. We employ commonly used diffuse priors which
allows us to benefit from Bayesian analysis without the diffi culty of obtaining an informative
prior. In particular, we employ a constant prior for Φ and the Jeffreys prior for Σ, PJ (Σ) ∝
|Σ|−(G+1)/2, which means that PCJ (Φ,Σ) ∝ PJ (Σ). The Bayes estimators are obtained via
Monte Carlo (MC) simulations. By sampling (Φ,Σ) from the joint posterior distribution, we
generate the Bayes estimates numerically. Let the OLS estimates of (Φ,Σ) be (B,S). Under
these assumptions, the posteriors are:
Σ ∼ IW
[
(NTS)−1 , NT −GLY −HLW
]






where the posteriors of Σ are drawn from an inverse Wishart distribution, which takes as its
arguments (NTS)−1 and degrees of freedom, NT − GLY − HLW where LY and LW are the
number of lags Y andW respectively. The posteriors of Φ are drawn from a normal distribution,
the countries in our sample was 7 years (the data is from Faraglia et al. (2011) who source the OECD and The
Economist).
Our choice of a VAR with 2 lags came from the use of standard lag length selection criteria. We considered
VAR specifications with lag lengths from 1 to 7. The Schwarz Bayesian Criterion indicated a single lag, the
Hannan-Quinn Criterion indicated two lags while the Akaike Information Criterion indicated 7 lags.
22The stock-flow adjustment captures, among other things, changes in the size of foreign-currency denominated
debt associated with a change in the exchange rate, financial transactions in relation to government support to
financial institutions, privatization receipts, the purchase of assets, and statistical recording discrepancies.
As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the estimated fiscal adjustment may be affected if we do not account
for all important factors that generate movements in the debt-to-GDP ratio. For, instance, when a government
purchases an asset by issuing government debt that does not appear as an expenditure in the fiscal accounts,
but investors adjust the rate at which they are willing to lend, this may be identified as a cost of borrowing
shock rather than a fiscal policy shock in our model. And, if these shocks were economically sizeable, they could
therefore distort the true response of fiscal policy to cost of borrowing shocks in our results.
However, in an earlier working paper version (see de Groot et al. (2012)), we included the stock-flow adjustment
term as an additional endogenous variable in our model as a robustness check and found our main results to be
little affected. Hence, we retain the more parsimonious set up used in the following analysis.
15
where X is the matrix containing the right-hand side variables. To generate the error bands
around our impulse responses, we ran 5000 MC iterations.23
3.3 Identification
The estimated model, in its reduced form (equation (9)), lacks economic structure. This is
because the errors, u, that result from a one-step ahead forecast of the corresponding component
of Y are unlikely to be orthogonal innovations since Σu is unlikely to be diagonal. To give
the model, and the shocks, economic structure, we must place some restrictions on the model
that allow us to decompose the non-orthogonal innovations into orthogonal and economically
interpretable shocks. We can do this by choosing a matrix B such that BΣuB′ = I since the new
shocks, ε = Bu will satisfy E (εε′) = I. These orthogonalized innovations have the convenient
property that they are uncorrelated across equations. There are many such factorizations of
Σu, so the choice of method of orthogonalizing is not innocuous. The aim is to choose B such
that the estimated model has a clear structural form with shocks, ε, that have a convincing
economic interpretation.
There are several commonly used methods to recover the structural form (i.e. to identify
shocks) in the literature. We identify cost of borrowing shocks by making use of a methodology
which imposes sign restrictions (see Faust (1998), Uhlig (2005), and Canova and Nicoló (2002))
upon impulse responses.24
The idea behind our identification strategy is that a cost-of-borrowing shock is a surprise
change in the government’s nominal cost of borrowing that is orthogonal to all other macro-
economic shocks. We do not want to impose any prior restrictions on the behavior of the
endogenous variables to a cost-of-borrowing shock. Instead, our identification strategy imposes
sign restrictions that lead to the identification of a set of shocks that have been commonly studied
in the macroeconomic literature. Any unexplained variation in our cost-of-borrowing variable
that is orthogonal to these other macroeconomic shocks is then judged to be a cost-of-borrowing
shock.
23 Increasing the number of runs to 10,000 does not significantly alter inference.
24Fry and Pagan (2011), in their critical review of the sign restriction literature, identify two problems with
this methodology; the multiple models problem and the multiple shocks problem. The multiple models problem
refers to the fact that there can be many sets of impulse responses, i.e. many models that fit the sign restrictions.
To overcome this problem, we use an additional criterion - a penalty function - to identify one unique model. The
multiple shocks problem arises if there is a failure to specify enough information to discriminate between shocks.
We partly overcome this problem by identifying as many shocks as there are left-hand side variables. However,
there still remains the possibility that the shocks we identify are really linear combinations of other structural
shocks that we do not consider. See also Arias et al. (2014).
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The theoretical model we presented in Section 2 is not rich enough to provide a robust
set of sign restrictions to identify all the macroeconomic shocks we are interested in. The
sign restrictions are therefore chosen from a wide reading of the macroeconomic literature to
complement the findings from our theoretical model and arrive at a set of sign restrictions that
are as uncontroversial as possible. For two reasons, we also only impose sign restrictions on
the responses of variables on impact. First, using impact sign restrictions in a model with
annual data is analogous to the existing literature which usually imposes sign restrictions for
four quarters in a model with quarterly data. Second, the nonlinearity from the debt-to-GDP
feedback severely complicates the identification strategy if sign restrictions are imposed at further
horizons.
Rather than simultaneously identifying all the shocks, subject to the orthogonality restric-
tions, we identify the shocks sequentially via a penalty function following the method of Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2009). Conceptually, for the first shock to be identified, the penalty function
method finds the set of parameter restrictions which minimize the sum of
pf (xj) =
 −xj if xj > 0−100xj if xj ≤ 0 , (10)
across the sign restricted variables j = 1, ..., J , where J ≤ G and where xj is the impact
response of variable j (rescaled by the standard error of variable j). The function pf (.)
rewards large impulse responses with the right sign (we assume in equation (10) that we are
looking for a positive response) more than small responses and punishes responses that go in
the wrong direction. The second shock is then identified in the same way, with the additional
restriction that it be orthogonal to the first shock. The rest of the shocks are identified similarly.
The consequence of this sequential identification is that the penalty function ascribes as much
movement as possible to the first shock, then the second shock and so on.
An overview of our identifying sign restrictions on the impulse responses is provided in Table
3. First, we identify an aggregate demand shock (row 1). The (+) symbols in the first
row indicate that an aggregate demand shock is anything that generates, on impact, a positive
comovement between the growth rate of GDP, the inflation rate and the short-term interest rate.
The blank spaces in the first row indicates that we are agnostic about how, for example, the
government primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio responds, on impact, to an aggregate demand
shock. Since we associate aggregate demand shocks with the predominant cause of business
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Table 3: 8-variable VAR sign restrictions
Primary Revenue GDP Inflation Implicit Short Long
Variables: expenditure -to-GDP growth rate interest interest interest
-to-GDP rate rate rate rate
Shocks:
Aggregate demand · · (+) (+) · (+) ·
Cost-push · · (−) (+) · (+) ·
Monetary policy · · (−) (−) · (+) ·
Primary expenditure (+) · (+) · · · ·
Revenue · (+) (−) · · · ·
Cost of borrowing · · · · (+) (+) (+)
Note: (+) or (−) mean that the response of variable x to shock y on year of impact is restricted to be
positive or negative, respectively. A blank space means no restriction has been imposed.
cycle fluctuations, we identify this shock first.
Second and third, we identify a cost-push shock and a monetary policy shock. The sign
restrictions that we impose are uncontroversial – they are the predictions of the canonical new-
Keynesian model. Fourth and fifth, we identify two fiscal policy shocks, a primary expenditure
shock and a revenue shock. Both are identified by restricting the sign of the GDP growth rate
response: A government expenditure shock is assumed to boost output (i.e. the government
spending multiplier is greater than 0) while the revenue shock depresses output. Again, without
placing any prior restrictions on the responses of endogenous variables to a cost of borrowing
shock, we force ourselves to identify five common macroeconomic shocks in order to recover a
cost of borrowing shock that is truly orthogonal to other fluctuations in the macroeconomy. A
cost of borrowing shock, in our scheme, is one in which the 10 year government bond yield, short
term interest rate and implicit interest rate all rise on impact, yet is orthogonal to the response
that the other five macroeconomic shocks generate.
A natural concern may arise regarding the ordering in which shocks are identified. How does
the choice of ordering allow us to distinguish between shocks that are assumed to have the same
effect on the same variables, such as the aggregate demand and primary expenditure shocks?25
The nature of the penalty function means that the shocks identified earlier are likely to account
for a larger share of total fluctuations. It seems reasonable therefore to order the business cycle
shocks ahead of the fiscal policy shocks. More importantly, however, while switching the order
is important for the identification of these two shocks, we find that the ordering of the first five
shocks has almost no effect on the identification and impulse responses of the shock of interest,
25We are grateful to an anonymous referee for alerting us to this issue.
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namely the cost of borrowing shock.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Figure 3 displays the impulse responses to a temporary cost of borrowing shock over a 10-year
horizon. The responses have been normalized so that the implicit interest rate (denoted nominal
C.o.B.) always rises by 1 percentage point. The initial level of the debt-to-GDP ratio will impact
the impulse responses. In Figure 3, we initialize the debt-to-GDP ratio to 50% which is close
to the sample mean. In Figure 6 below, we report sensitivity results to this choice of initial
value. All the fiscal variables are measured in percentage points of GDP, while the interest rate
and growth variables are measured in percent.
The impulse responses reveal four key results. First, the cost of borrowing shock generates
a relatively persistent effect on the nominal implicit interest rate, which takes 4 years to halve.
Second, it is revenues rather than primary expenditures that react to the cost of borrowing
shock, with the revenue-to-GDP ratio 0.2 percentage points higher at the end of the 10 year
horizon and the response of the primary expenditure-to-GDP remaining insignificant throughout
the 10 year horizon. Third, the fiscal policy adjustment is not immediate. The primary
balance is unchanged on impact but still does not turn significantly positive until the second
year following the shock. Fiscal adjustment between years 3 and 5 is fairly rapid before reaching
peak adjustment in year 7. The cumulative change in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio reaches
0.04, 0.40 and 1.75 percentage points in years 2, 5 and 10 following the shock. Fourth, the fiscal
adjustment is insuffi cient to counteract the debt-increasing effect from the cost-of-borrowing
shock over this time horizon. The debt-to-GDP ratio rises by 1.7 percentage points in year 6
and falls slightly to 1.3 percentage points above baseline in year 10.
The inflation and growth adjusted cost of borrowing response follows closely that of the
nominal cost of borrowing response. This is because the responses of output growth and
inflation are both either economically or statically insignificant. It also suggests, as we might
expect, that the cost of borrowing shock is not an important driver of the business cycle. In
other words, the model attributes only a small proportion of the variance of inflation and output
growth to the cost of borrowing shock.
It is useful in what follows to work with a more parsimonious version of the VAR, where we
19
Figure 3: Responses to 1 p.p.t. increase in cost of borrowing
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Note: The cost of borrowing shock is ordered sixth and orthogonal to the business cycle, monetary and fiscal
policy shocks. The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by
Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses have been normalized to a 1
percentage point rise in the implicit interest rate (nominal C.o.B.). The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially 50%.
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only include the endogenous variables that enter the debt accumulation equation. In principle,
as explained in Appendix A.2, the two market rates that we have available – the 3 month rate
and 10 year bond yield – are important to extract variations in the nominal cost of borrowing
measure that are not a sum of moving average terms. However, in practice, the inclusion of these
market interest rates does not greatly alter inference about the fiscal adjustment in response to
a cost of borrowing shock.
Figure 4 compares the identified impulse response to a cost of borrowing shock in the more
parsimonious 5-variable VAR relative to the initial 7-variable VAR we estimated. The key
difference in terms of identification is that we do not identify a monetary policy shock.
In terms of the quantitative differences in responses, the 5-variable VAR produces a mar-
ginally stronger primary balance response to a 1 percentage point rise in the government’s cost
of borrowing. As a consequence the median debt to GDP ratio only peaks at 1.3 percentage
points above baseline relative to 1.7 percentage points before.
Since the responses are very similar, we work with the more parsimonious 5 variable set up
for the rest of the paper. In particular, this is convenient when we conduct sub-sample analysis
in Section 4.4.
4.2 Identified cost of borrowing shocks
Figure 5 presents the identified cost of borrowing shocks, which are, by construction, orthogonal
to the preceding macro and policy shocks we identify.26 It suggests that the variance of cost-of-
borrowing shocks was significantly higher in the 1980s and early 1990s than the late 1990s and
early 2000s, across Europe.27
It is useful to graphically inspect if the identified shocks actually coincide or precede periods
that have been identified as entailing strong fiscal efforts by certain governments. To this end,
the shaded areas in Figure 5 denote periods of fiscal consolidation as identified by the narrative
approach developed in Devries et al. (2011). The two measures appear to be weakly correlated.
26We have relegated the identified macro and policy shocks, as well as their corresponding impulse responses
to Appendix B.3. Replication files for all the figures in this section, written in RATS code, are available from
the corresponding author’s homepage, http://sites.google.com/site/oliverdegroot/research
27 In fact, the time series of identified cost-of-borrowing shocks in Figure 5 might not appear as one might expect,
as we identify no large positive shocks for the countries struggling with the current sovereign debt crisis. In part,
this relates to our discussion (in Section 3) of the marginal versus average cost of borrowing concepts. While the
marginal cost of borrowing (proxied by 10 year government bond yields) for Greece, Ireland and Portugal etc. has
increased sharply in recent years, their average cost of borrowing, which we use in this estimation, has moved by
much less. The second explanation is that a considerable portion of the rise in governments’cost of borrowing
in recent years may have been driven by changes in governments’primary deficits and debt, and have not been
the consequence of unanticipated cost of borrowing shocks.
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Figure 4: Responses to a 1 p.p.t. cost of borrowing shock
5 variable VAR






































































Note: The cost of borrowing shock is ordered fifth and orthogonal to the business cycle and fiscal policy shocks.
The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo
integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses have been normalized to a 1 percentage
point rise in the implicit interest rate (nominal C.o.B.). The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially 50%.
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Positive cost-of-borrowing shocks preceded the fiscal adjustment in Italy in the mid-1990s, Por-
tugal in 1981, Finland in 1992 and Sweden in the end-1990s. The most striking omission is the
apparent lack of fiscal adjustment following the cost of borrowing shocks in Portugal in 1990
and Spain in 1986. However, using an alternative measure of fiscal consolidations, Alesina and
Perotti (1995) [Table 5. pp.218] record strong fiscal adjustments for Portugal in 1989 and Spain
in 1986-87.
4.3 Initial conditions and debt feedback
The addition of the governments’ budget constraint, in the form of the lagged debt-to-GDP
ratio, generates a feedback mechanism in the vector autoregression model and potentially strong
nonlinearities in the responses to shocks. In particular, as shown in Section 2, we expect the
fiscal adjustment to a cost of borrowing shock to be sensitive to the level of the debt-to-GDP
ratio at the time of the shock. Figure 6 illustrates this non-linearity by plotting the median
impulse responses of the primary expenditure-, revenue-, primary balance- and debt-to-GDP
ratios to a cost of borrowing shock with two different initial debt-to-GDP ratios, 20% and 140%
respectively (and the baseline impulse responses plot in the background). This experiment
considers how the response of the same "representative" country to a cost of borrowing shock
differs if its current debt-to-GDP ratio is either high or low (relative to a given historical average).
Not until Figure 8 do we distinguish between the fiscal responses of countries with historically
high and historically low average debt-to-GDP ratios.
This scenario analysis shows two interesting patterns in the mechanics of fiscal adjustment,
depending on initial conditions. First, when a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio is high at the onset
of a cost of borrowing shock, it makes substantially larger primary balance adjustments. The
cumulative primary balance adjustment over 10 years is 3.6% of GDP when the initial debt-to-
GDP ratio is 140%, relative to an adjustment of 1.9% when the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is 50%.
Moreover, the median debt-to-GDP response peaks earlier in the 140% initial debt-to-GDP ratio
scenario than in the 50% initial debt-to-GDP ratio scenario. However, the peak change in the
debt-to-GDP ratio is larger when the initial debt-to-GDP ratio is higher. Second, with a high
initial debt-to-GDP ratio the fiscal adjustment comes both via primary expenditure cuts and
revenue increases. Using the median responses, for the 50% initial debt-to-GDP scenario, 12%
of the fiscal adjustment is via cuts in primary expenditure. For the 140% initial debt-to-GDP
ratio scenario, primary expenditure cuts account for 43% of the fiscal adjustment.
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Figure 5: Identified Cost of Borrowing Shocks
Austria



















































































Note: The y-axis measures the identified cost of borrowing shock with a unit standard deviation, the x-axis
measures time in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and
84th percentiles. The shaded areas are periods of fiscal consolidation identified by the narrative approach in
Devries et al. (2011).
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to initial Debt-to-GDP ratio

































Note: Impulse responses to a cost of borrowing shock which raises the implicit interest rate by 1 percentage
point. The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo
integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles.
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The estimates presented till now all refer to the combined impact of the cost of borrowing
shock on budgetary variables, comprising a direct effect (as a rise in interest rates might induce
governments to adjust their budgets) and indirect effects (as the interest rate shocks also transmit
via other variables in the system —notably the government debt ratio). At the same time, a
large body of literature, at least since Bohn (1998), has described the behavior of fiscal policy
in terms of fiscal reaction functions as a way to estimate the "partial" primary balance response
to changes in government debt (while controlling for other important macroeconomic variables).
To disentangle the direct effect of a cost of borrowing increase from its indirect effect transmitted
via the debt ratio, we consider two experiments, which are presented in Figure 7. The first is to
re-estimate the model, excluding the debt-to-GDP ratio as a lagged explanatory variable (thus
isolating the direct cost of borrowing effect). The second is to restrict the coeffi cients on the
cost of borrowing for the primary expenditure and revenue variables to zero (thus isolating the
indirect effect coming through the debt ratio). The impulse responses are presented in Figure
7.
They reveal two interesting results. First, the response of the primary balance to a cost
of borrowing shock is still significantly positive, even in the absence of debt feedback. This
suggests that budgetary policies do not only respond to the current debt-to-GDP ratio, but also
financial markets’expectations of future debt dynamics, as proxied by the cost of borrowing.
However, the budgetary response is insuffi cient to counteract the increase in the debt ratio, at
least in the medium term. Second, in the absence of interest rate feedback, the adjustment of
the primary balance is more sluggish than in the baseline case but then overshoots it. This
pattern may reflect that fiscal policy-makers, by construction, ignore the contemporaneous cost
of borrowing effect in this scenario and only respond to it once it materializes via rising debt
ratios; vice versa, once they detect the cost of borrowing shock through the debt increase, they
need a stronger adjustment to reverse the upward drift in this stock variable over time.
4.4 Heterogeneity across sub-samples
Thus far, we have considered the 14 countries as a homogenous block, restricting the responses
to a cost of borrowing shock to be the same across the sample. While we lack suffi cient
degrees of freedom to estimate the model for each individual country, we can attempt to explain
potential heterogeneity by sub-dividing our sample along several dimensions. Indeed, the model
presented in Section 2 has identified several important factors that may shape the response to
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Figure 7: No debt and no interest rate feedback
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Note: Impulse responses to a cost of borrowing shock. The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in
years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles.
cost of borrowing shocks, including the presence of fiscal rules and the costs associated with
fiscal adjustments —for instance, related to the process of political consensus building. The key
results are reported in Figure 8. The countries which comprise each sub-group are reported in
Table 4. It is important to emphasize that these results are based on somewhat ad hoc sorting
of countries into sub-samples, which may reduce their robustness. However, we think they are
interesting to warrant future research.
The first row of Figure 8 reports responses to a cost-of-borrowing shock for the 11 EMU
countries, pre- and post-1992. We are interested in whether the signing of the Maastricht Treaty
(in 1992) – which binds countries to adhere to the Maastricht criteria, restricting government
deficits and debts – affected the fiscal response to cost of borrowing shocks. In the pre-
Maastricht period, there is a relatively small positive primary balance response to a cost-of-
borrowing shock. By contrast, in the post-Maastricht period, the response of the primary
balance is significantly larger. In fact, the rise in the primary balance is suffi ciently strong to
generate a fall of the debt-to-GDP ratio to 46.5%, below its initial value of 50%, at the end of
the 10 year horizon.
The second row of Figure 8 sub-divides the 14 countries based on a measure of political
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Table 4: Country Groupings
A. Maastricht Treaty B. Political constraintsc C. Government indebtednessd
1 Austria Yes Most 0.78 Most 51%
2 Belgium Yes Most 0.87 Most 98%
3 Germany Yes Most 0.83 Least 45%
4 France Yes Most 0.79 Least 39%
5 Finland Yes Most 0.78 Least 28%
6 Greece Yesa Least 0.36 Least 46%
7 Ireland Yes Least 0.75 Most 68%
8 Italy Yes Least 0.76 Most 67%
9 Netherlands Yes Most 0.83 Most 89%
10 Portugal Yes Least 0.62 Most 60%
11 Spain Yes Least 0.77 Least 50%
12 Denmark Nob Most 0.78 Least 48%
13 UK No Least 0.74 Most 51%
14 Sweden No Least 0.76 Least 49%
Note: a Greece adopted the Euro in 2001. b Denmark opted out of the Maastricht Treaty but remains in ERM
II. c Average value of the POLCON index, Henisz (2000), for the period 1970-94. d Average government
debt-to-GDP ratio for the period 1970-2011.
risk - the Political Constraint Index (POLCON) - developed by Henisz (2000). It attempts
to measure "the ability of a government to craft a credible commitment to an existing policy
regime" and prevent the "potential for arbitrary or capricious" policymaking, with a low score
being more hazardous and a high score being more constrained. We take an average of the
POLCON measure over the period 1970-1994 and split the sample of countries into a high and
low grouping, using the median value in the sample as the threshold. The responses are robust
to a 8-6 or 6-8 split of countries. The responses in Figure 8 for the two groups are supportive of
the view that politically more constrained countries, which presumably face fewer obstacles in
agreeing and implementing a certain policy path, demonstrate a more responsive fiscal stance.
For example, the primary balance response of the low group is not significantly different from
zero, while the response of the high group is significant and positive. Interestingly, the rise in
the primary balance for the high group countries is the result of a fall in primary expenditure
following a cost-of-borrowing shock.
Finally, the third row of Figure 8 sub-divides the 14 countries based on their historical
indebtedness. Inference drawn from these impulse responses should be made with caution since
there is a potential endogeneity problem, from the impulse responses, back to the groupings.
The responses reveal that the primary balances of countries that on average have high debt do
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Legend:  7 countries with least indebted governments,  7 countries with most indebted governments
Note: Impulse responses to a cost of borrowing shock. The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in
years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles.
not respond to cost of borrowing shocks, while those for countries which on average have less
debt do respond positively. The median debt-to-GDP ratio of a highly indebted country rises
by 2.7 percentage points, while the debt-to-GDP ratio of a less indebted country is insignificantly
different from its initial level, at the 10 year horizon.
Note that this result is not in contradiction to the finding reported in Figure 6, which suggest
that when a country experiences a cost of borrowing shock at a time when its debt-to-GDP ratio
is high relative to what is normal for that country, the fiscal response to that cost of borrowing
shock is also stronger relative to its normal response.
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5 Conclusions
This paper examines the response of fiscal variables to exogenous changes in sovereign borrowing
costs using a panel of European countries over four decades. To motivate the empirical analysis,
we develop a simple model of fiscal behavior. This model shows that governments tend to react
to increases in the cost of borrowing by improving their primary balances, but the scale and
composition of the budgetary response depends on initial fiscal conditions and several structural
features of the economy. In particular, the primary budget response is strong if the initial
debt-to-GDP ratio is high, costs of adjusting fiscal instruments (e.g. related to administrative
implementation and/or political consensus building) are low, and fiscal rules pose a binding
constraint on budgetary decision-making. These parameters also determine the implications for
sovereign debt dynamics subsequent to a cost of borrowing shock: for calibrations generating a
relatively weak fiscal response, the improvement in the primary budget balance is insuffi cient to
compensate for the debt-increasing effect of higher borrowing costs.
The empirical analysis confirms a positive response in the primary budget balance ratio
to sovereign cost of borrowing shocks. At the sample average, however, this response is not
suffi ciently strong to return the debt-to-GDP ratio to baseline over a 10-year horizon. The
adjustment is found to only become statistically significant two years after the shock and to
be generated mainly via the revenue side. At the same time, there is some tentative evidence
that the magnitude of adjustment in response to a cost of borrowing shock is larger when the
debt-to-GDP ratio is high relative to a country’s average. Also, the larger the adjustment, the
more emphasis is placed on expenditure cuts relative to tax increases.
When subdividing our sample, we find that EMU countries in the period after the signing
of the Maastricht Treaty show a significantly stronger budgetary response to cost-of-borrowing
shocks than the same countries in the pre-Maastricht period. A possible interpretation of this
pattern is that those countries that eventually joined monetary union had an additional incentive
to compensate for higher interest payments (which count against the Maastricht deficit criterion)
by tightening their stance with respect to other budget items.
Our results have important policy implications. The estimated average fiscal response sug-
gests that market discipline can improve budgetary outcomes. Provided that financial market
participants systematically and consistently sanction deteriorating fiscal positions through higher
interest rates, they may deter governments from building up imbalances. At the same time, ex-
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perience since the start of EMU shows that the relationship between the fiscal “health” of a
country and its borrowing rates can be subject to abrupt shifts, which renders financial markets
less reliable as an incentive mechanism for governments. Moreover, our estimates show that the
budgetary response to market pressure tends to be delayed and alone is not suffi cient to fully
counteract its direct unfavourable effect on debt dynamics via rising interest payments. This
in turn, suggests that further incentive mechanisms are needed to ensure that countries follow
a fiscal reaction function aimed at restoring fiscal sustainability in a timely manner. Judging
from our results, fiscal rules are an important complement to markets in this regard.
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A Appendix
A.1 The model: social planner first order conditions, the steady state and
functional forms
The first-order conditions of the government’s problem in equation (6) are:
ct : 0 =
 uc,t − µ1,t (τ c,tξτt ξatnt + 1) + µ2,t (ξτt ξatnt − φτ1,t) τ c,t − µ3,tucc,t
−βEtµ2,t+1φτ2,t+1τ c,t + µ3,t−1ucc,trht−1
 , (11)
nt : 0 =

un,t + µ1,t (−τn,tξτt ξatnt + (1− τ tξτt ) ξat )
+µ2,t
(


































































When we assume that the government does not fully internalize it’s choices on the interest rate
(see the discussion related to Figure 2), we scale rgbg ,t and r
g
n,t by a factor of
1
2 .
The steady state conditions of the model are:
c : 0 = uc − µ1 (τ cn+ 1) + µ2nτ c − µ3ucc − βµ2φτ2τ c + µ3uccrht , (16)
n : 0 =



















g : 0 = vg − µ2, (18)


















bh + (1− τ)n− c, (21)
0 = (1− rg) bg + τn− g. (22)
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From the household Euler equation, rh = β−1 and bh is a free parameter. This is not true of







This says that the more debt-elastic the interest rate (i.e. the higher φg), the larger the steady
state interest discount, αg, must be in order to induce the government to maintain a certain
steady state debt-to-GDP ratio.
Finally, the functional form for the utility function and the two interest rate equations are
as follows:







































A.2 Marginal and average cost of borrowing
The model presented in Section 2 does not distinguish between the average and marginal cost
of borrowing (the implicit government interest rate and the current market bond yield, to use
the language of Section 3) because all debt has one-period maturity. To see the relationship
between the average and marginal cost of borrowing, consider the following simple model.
We approximate the maturity structure of government debt using a continuum of callable
perpetuity bonds with stochastic call date. With probability p a bond is called (matures) and
with probability 1− p it survives until the next period. The stock of debt, bgt , evolves as





where bgn,t is newly issued debt. The average cost of borrowing, i
g
a,t, evolves as











where igt is the marginal cost of borrowing (i.e. the interest rate of new debt). i
g
t is the net
interest rate (Section 2 used gross interest rate notation, rgt ≡ 1 + i
g




market rate that the government observes when making fiscal policy decisions. After setting
its fiscal policy instruments, the debt management offi ce is responsible for issuing debt as and
when financing needs arise during the year. As a result, the true cost of borrowing on new debt















bgt−1 + τ tnt.



















τ tnt returns the model back to the flow budget constraint in equation (5) (ignoring quadratic
adjustment cost terms and other fiscal policy shocks). Suppose we log-linearize the model





a = ig. Therefore:







Notice that the evolution of the average cost of borrowing is independent of the amount of new






If we simply estimate a VAR with ĩga,t and not ĩ
g
t , then we will recover the following process:







2εigt−2 + · · ·+ pεcobt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Estimated cob shock
,
where the estimated shock is a function of an MA process in εigt and the shock ε
cob
t . Thus, we
28To place this model within an institutional context, consider the UK. The UK government is responsible
for making tax and spending decisions for the coming year, given current macroeconomic, fiscal, and financial
market conditions. Then there is the UK Debt Management Offi ce (DMO), who’s remit is to "carry out the
Government’s debt management policy of minimizing financing costs over the long term, taking account of risk,
and to minimize the cost of offsetting the Government’s net cash flows over time" (see About the DMO at
http://www.dmo.gov.uk). Since the cost of debt management is much more complex than simply observing the
current 10 year market yield on UK Gilts, the ex post calculation of total interest payments can alter the fiscal
conditions in which the UK government makes its next set of tax and spending decision.
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The key identifying information we get from this is that there is a zero restriction on the
contemporaneous response of the marginal cost of borrowing to the cost of borrowing shock,
εcobt .
A.3 Data sources
All the data we use is publicly available. The majority of the data is taken from AMECO,
which is the annual macro-economic database of the European Commission’s Directorate General
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN). Some of the interest rate series have been
supplemented using data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database of the IMF.
All variables used in the PVAR were year and country demeaned to account for country specific
and time specific fixed effects (and the degrees of freedom in the estimated model appropriately
adjusted). All AMECO codes are provided in brackets.
• GDP growth rate is the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product at constant prices (OVGD).
• Inflation rate is the growth rate of the GDP Deflator (PVGD).
• Nominal short-term interest rate (ISN). This is usually a 3 month interbank rate. See
the AMECO website for further details of the country specific interest rates used for this
measure. For several countries, data from the IFS IMF Country Tables, row 60c (Treasury
Bill Rate) has been used to supplement series for missing values in AMECO.
• Implicit interest rate (AYIGD), which is calculated as the ratio of total interest payments
in year t to the debt stock in period t− 1.
• Nominal long-term interest rate (ILN). This is usually a 10 year government bond yield.
See the AMECO website for further details of the country specific interest rates used
for this measure. For several countries, data from the IFS IMF Country Tables, row
61 (Government Bond Yield) has been used to supplement series for missing values in
AMECO.
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• Debt is General Government Consolidated Gross Debt (UDGG) as a ratio of GDP.
• Revenue is the sum of Revenue from Indirect Taxes (UTVG), Revenue from Direct Taxes
(UTYG) and Social Contributions Received (UTSG) as a ratio of GDP.
• Primary expenditure is the sum of Expenditure on Benefits (UYTGH), Expenditure on
Wages (UWCG) and Expenditure on Other (which is Total Current Expenditure excluding
Interest (UUCGI) minus Expenditure on Benefits and Wages) as a ratio of GDP.
B Online appendix (not for publication)
B.1 Data description
Figure 9 plots the individual time series from 1970 to 2011 of fiscal variables and interest rate
series of all 14 European countries in our sample. The top two panels give the impression of
an upward drift in both primary expenditure and tax ratios for many of the countries in our
sample. However, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio, in the middle-left panel, at a glance
appears stationary.29 The noticeable outlier in this panel is the Irish bailout of the banking
system in 2010, which accounted for almost 20% of GDP. The debt-to-GDP ratio, in the middle-
right panel, follows a similar pattern for many of the countries in our sample, with low levels
of debt in the 1970s, rising sharply in the 1980s before falling back in the late 1990s and early
2000s. The crisis on 2008 has caused the debt-to-GDP ratios of several countries to rise sharply
again, with several countries displaying a debt-to-GDP ratio of more than 100%. The bottom
two panels plot the nominal implicit interest rate (defined as the ratio of interest payments to
outstanding debt) and the nominal long-term interest rate (in most cases the 10 year government
bond yield), respectively. The majority of the low frequency movement in these series is the
result of the inflation, which was, broadly speaking, high during the 1970s and early 1980s and
has fallen steadily since. A noticeable difference between the two series is the spike in bond
yields in the period 2009-2011 which is absent from the implicit interest rate measure. This
is because, despite bond yields rising in financial markets, few of these governments actually
borrowed in financial markets at these elevated interest rates.
Table 5 and 6 report several key statistics from the time series that were plotted in Figure
9. In particular, Table 6 highlights some of the heterogeneity, both across time and across
29Formal tests of stationarity are conducted below.
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Figure 9: Time series of fiscal variables
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Table 5: Fiscal variables: Stylized facts I
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max
Primary expenditure-to-GDP 42.9% 8.13% 16.9% 66.0%
(PRT,71) (SWE,93)
Revenue-to-GDP 43.7% 9.00% 19.6% 66.7%
(PRT,72) (SWE,89)
Primary balance-to-GDP 0.8% 3.69% -28.0% 11.6%
(IRL,10) (DNK,86)
Debt-to-GDP 56.6% 28.6% 6.20% 165.3%
(DNK,74) (GRC,11)
Implied nominal interest rate 7.80% 3.25% 2.35% 21.33%
(SPA,72) (DNK,76)
Longer term bond yield 8.43% 4.07% 2.61% 27.74%
(GER,11) (PRT,85)
Note: Statistics for the entire panel. The brackets denote the country and year.
countries. The debt-to-GDP shows a large volatility, with a standard deviation ranging from
12.8% in the UK to 41.0% in Greece.
Table 7 presents several unit root tests. The two panel based unit root tests come to
the same verdict that the primary balance-to-GDP ratio series are stationary while the debt-to-
GDP ratio series display a unit root. The country specific tests suggest some heterogeneity with
some displaying stationary dynamics while others display nonstationary dynamics. However,
a smaller share of the countries display stationarity in their debt-to-GDP ratios than in their
primary balance-to-GDP ratios.
B.2 Impulse responses from the theoretical model
In addition to the cost of borrowing shock, the model in Section 2 contains additional exogenous
stochastic processes (for technology, government spending and income taxes). Figure 10 presents
typical impulse responses behaviour of the model to these disturbances.
B.3 Identified shocks
This appendix contains the identified shocks and impulse responses of the 4 shocks of the 5
variable PVAR that we identify before the cost of borrowing shock. Due to space constraints,
we plot the identified shocks only for a sub-set of the countries in our sample. Further details
are available from the authors on request. The error bands around the identified shocks and
impulse responses are generated by Monte Carlo integration, and we plot the 16th, 50th and
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Table 6: Fiscal variables: Stylized facts II
Variable Mean by country Mean by year St. dev. by country St. dev. by year
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest Lowest Highest
Primary expenditure-to-GDP 33.5% 54.4% 33.1% 50.2% 2.54% 8.20% 3.50% 9.40%
(PRT) (SWE) (70) (10) (GER) (PRT) (08) (79)
Revenue-to-GDP 32.4% 58.2% 35.8% 46.8% 1.74% 7.34% 5.70% 10.75%
(GRC) (SWE) (70) (93) (GER) (PRT) (07) (78)
Primary balance-to-GDP -1.21% 4.11% -4.82% 4.74% 1.46% 6.27% 1.95% 7.24%
(GRC) (DNK) (10) (00) (AUS) (IRL) (99) (10)
Debt-to-GDP 28.5% 97.2% 27.8% 85.1% 12.8% 41.0% 18.0% 33.7%
(FIN) (BEL) (73) (11) (UK) (GRC) (78) (11)
Implied nominal interest rate 5.59% 10.24% 3.76% 11.00% 1.30% 4.85% 0.38% 4.38%
(SPA) (DNK) (11) (82) (AUS) (PRT) (07) (75)
Longer term bond yield 6.44% 11.63% 3.49% 14.79% 2.05% 5.96% 0.12% 5.06%
(GER) (GRC) (05) (81) (AUS) (GRC) (01) (85)
Note: The brackets denote either the country or the year.
Table 7: Unit root tests
Variable Country specific tests Full panel tests
ADF (C) ADF(C+T) KPSS (C) KPSS (C+T) IPS LL
Primary balance Stationary: Verdict:
-to-GDP AUS, GER AUS, GER AUT, GER, AUS, GER stationary stationary
FIN, FRA SWE SPA, FIN SPA, FIN
NLD, DNK FRA, IRL FRA, DNK




-to-GDP NLD GER, NLD IRL, NLD, GER, FIN, unit root unit root
DNK, GBR FRA, GRC
Note: ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, KPSS is the Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin test, IPS
is the Im, Pesaran and Shin test and LL is the Levin-Lin test. C denotes a constant also included in the test
and T a deterministic linear trend. ADF, IPS and LL test the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root.
KSPP tests a null of stationarity. A 5% critical value is used to determine whether a test is deemed to suggest
stationarity or the existence of a unit root. The ADF, IPS and LL tests use the Akaike Information Criterion to
determine the appropriate lag length. The lag length in the KPSS test is fixed at 2.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to macro and policy shocks
in a stylized small open economy model
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Note: Impulse responses to business cycle and policy shocks from the theoretical model. Benchmark
calibration with ψg= 500 and ψτ= 5.
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84th percentiles. The identified shocks have, by construction a standard deviation of 1. We
have included shaded areas to identify periods of recession. The impulse responses have been
normalized so that a variable of interest (see notes on each graph) rises by 1% on impact of the
shock, and have been drawn using an initial value of the debt-to-GDP ratio of 50%.
B.3.1 Aggregate demand shock
The aggregate demand shock is identified first, requiring GDP growth, inflation and the gov-
ernment revenue-to-GDP ratio to rise on impact. The identified aggregate demand shocks are
plotted in Figure 11. Due to the use of both time- and country-fixed effects, the aggregate de-
mand shocks correspond well with recessions which have been country specific, and corresponds
less well with synchronized periods of recession. For example, if we look at the 2008-2011 pe-
riod, countries that experienced relatively mild recessions appear to have experienced positive
aggregate demand shocks.
The impulse responses to an aggregate demand shock are plotted in Figure 12. A one
percentage point increase in GDP growth increases the government revenue-to-GDP ratio by
approximately 0.7 percentage points. With an average revenue-to-GDP ratio of 0.45, this
means a 1% rise in the GDP growth rate leads to an approximate 2.6% increase in revenues.30
This elasticity is above the estimate used by the European Commission. However, Mertens and
Ravn (2013) formulate an argument why the methodology used by the European Commission
might generate a downwardly biased estimate (although they use US data in their example).
While the effect on output growth is relatively short-lived, the rise in the government revenue-
to-GDP ratio is more persistent. The aggregate demand shock leads to a strong decline in the
debt-to-GDP ratio, because the primary balance improves, and because the shock generates a
large fall in the growth and inflation adjusted cost of borrowing for the government. Two years
following the shock, primary expenditure begins to rise, generating a reversal of the primary
balance.
B.3.2 Cost-push shock
The (negative) cost-push shock is identified second, requiring inflation to fall on impact and
GDP growth and revenues to rise, while also being orthogonal to the first shock. The identified
30The elasticity of revenues with respect to output is ξ = ∆R/R
∆Y/Y
. The model provides the following information:
∆Y/Y = 0.01, ∆ (R/Y ) ≈ 0.007 and R/Y ≈ 0.45. Using the approximation, ∆ (R/Y ) / (R/Y ) ≈ ∆R/R−∆Y/Y
we can rewrite the elasticity as ξ ≈ 1 + ∆(R/Y )/(R/Y )
∆Y/Y




Figure 11: Identified Aggregate Demand Shocks
Germany























































Note: The y-axis measures the identified aggregate demand shock with a unit standard deviation, the x-axis
measures time in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and
84th percentiles. The shaded areas are periods of recession.
Figure 12: Impulse Responses to an Aggregate Demand Shock

















































Note: The aggregate demand is ordered first. The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The
error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses
have been normalized to a 1 percentage point rise in the GDP growth rate. The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially
0.5.
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Figure 13: Identified Cost-Push Shocks
Germany























































Note: The y-axis measures the identified cost-push shock with a unit standard deviation, the x-axis measures
time in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th
percentiles. The shaded areas are periods of recession.
cost-push shocks are plotted in Figure 13. These identified shocks correspond well with the
existing literature, being more volatile for most countries in the pre-1990s part of the sample.
The impulse responses to a cost-push shock are plotted in Figure 14. We get a similar rise
in the government revenue-to-GDP ratio on impact from a 1% rise in the GDP growth rate, as
under an aggregate demand shock. The improvement in the primary balance for debt-to-GDP
dynamics is however offset by a sharp rise in the inflation and growth adjusted cost of borrowing.
While the nominal implicit interest rate falls moderately, the fall in inflation is more than twice
the rise in output growth.
B.3.3 Primary expenditure shock
The primary expenditure shock is identified third (jointly with the government revenue shock),
requiring the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio and the GDP growth rate to rise on impact,
while also being orthogonal to the two business cycle shocks. The identified primary expenditure
shocks are plotted in Figure 15. The series of identified shocks is dominated by Ireland in 2010.
Due to interventions in the banking system, the Irish government recorded a primary deficit-
to-GDP ratio of 28%. The results of the model are not sensitive to the inclusion of this single
data point.
The impulse responses to a primary expenditure shock are plotted in Figure 16. The
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Figure 14: Impulse Responses to a Cost-Push Shock














































Note: The cost-push shock is ordered second and orthogonal to the aggregate demand shock. The y-axis is in
percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing
the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses have been normalized to a 1 percentage point rise in the GDP
growth rate. The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially 0.5.
nominal implicit interest rate does not rise on impact, but does increase in the medium term,
rising by a maximum of 10 basis points. This is broadly consistent with the findings of Ardagna
et al. (2007). The 0.5 percentage point increase in the GDP growth rate corresponds to a
government spending multiplier of 0.2, substantially below 1.31 Assuming total revenues are
unchanged, the expansion in output can explain the reduction in the revenue-to-GDP ratio
on impact of the primary expenditure shock. This amplifies the deterioration of the primary
balance. Expansionary government spending also generates a rise in inflation.
B.3.4 Government revenue shock
The government revenue shock is identified third (jointly with the primary expenditure shock),
requiring the revenue-to-GDP ratio to rise and the GDP growth rate to fall on impact, while
also being orthogonal to the two business cycle shocks. Note that we do not require the two
fiscal policy shocks to be orthogonal, although adding this extra orthogonality restriction does
not materially alter the results in Section 4. The identified government revenue shocks are
plotted in Figure 17.
The impulse responses to a government revenue shock are plotted in Figure 18. A 1 per-
31The government spending multiplier is ξ = ∆Y/Y
∆E/E
. The model provides the following information: ∆ (E/Y ) =
0.01, ∆Y/Y ≈ 0.005 and E/Y ≈ 0.45. Using the approximation, ∆ (E/Y ) / (E/Y ) ≈ ∆E/E −∆Y/Y we can






Figure 15: Identified Primary Expenditure Shocks
Germany























































Note: The y-axis measures the identified primary expenditure shock with a unit standard deviation, the x-axis
measures time in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and
84th percentiles. The shaded areas are periods of recession.
Figure 16: Impulse Responses to a Primary Expenditure Shock














































Note: The primary expenditure shock is ordered (joint) third and orthogonal to the two business cycle shocks.
The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo
integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses have been normalized to a 1 percentage
point rise in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio. The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially 0.5.
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Figure 17: Identified Government Revenue Shocks
Germany















































Note: The y-axis measures the identified government revenue shock with a unit standard deviation, the x-axis
measures time in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo integration, showing the 16th, 50th and
84th percentiles. The shaded areas are periods of recession.
centage point rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio has a bigger impact on GDP growth than a 1
percentage point fall in the primary expenditure-to-GDP ratio. GDP growth falls by 1.5 percent-
age points on impact, implying an impact tax revenue multiplier of −2.1, which is substantially
greater than −1.32 Again, by assuming that primary expenditure is unchanged on impact due
to a government revenue shock, the fall in the denominator of the primary expenditure-to-GDP
ratio can account for its rise on impact of approximately 0.7 percentage points. The size of
the revenue multiplier means that the rise in the primary-balance to GDP ratio is smaller than
the rise in the revenue-to-GDP ratio. In addition, the fall in GDP growth (and subsequent fall
in inflation) generate a rise in the inflation and growth adjusted cost of borrowing, causing the
debt-to-GDP ratio to rise in the response to a positive revenue shock.
32The tax revenue multiplier is ξ = ∆Y/Y
∆R/R
. The model provides the following information: ∆ (R/Y ) = 0.01,
∆Y/Y ≈ −0.015 and R/Y ≈ 0.45. Using the approximation, ∆ (R/Y ) / (R/Y ) ≈ ∆R/R−∆Y/Y we can rewrite
the elasticity as ξ ≈ ∆Y/Y
∆Y/Y+∆(R/Y )/(R/Y )
= −0.015−0.015+0.01/0.45 = −2.1.
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Figure 18: Impulse Responses to a Government Revenue Shock








































Note: The government revenue shock is ordered (joint) third and orthogonal to the two business cycle shocks.
The y-axis is in percentage points, the x-axis is in years. The error bands are generated by Monte Carlo
integration, showing the 16th, 50th and 84th percentiles. Responses have been normalized to a 1 percentage
point rise in the government revenue-to-GDP ratio. The debt-to-GDP ratio is initially 0.5.
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